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7~ CLINKSCALES v. CARVER [22 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 18480. In Bank. Apr. 29, 1943.] 
LOIS A. CLINKSCALES et al., Respondents, v. HERMAN 
ROLAND CARVER, Appellant. 
[la, Ib] Automobiles,-Actions-Instructions,-Care of Operator-
Violation of Regulation-Boulevard Stops.-In an, action for 
wrongful death resulting from a collision of automobiles at an 
intersection, it was not prejudicial error t9 instruct the, jury 
to return a verdict for plaintiffs if defendant failed to observe 
a boulevard stop-sign before entering the intersElction and if 
such fail1;tre proximately caused the accident, notwithstanding 
the fact that there was no official authorization for the erec-
tion of such sign, as the question of defendant's negligence 
would not turn upon the irregularity of, the authorization or 
the effect of such irregularity on his criminal liability. 
[2] Torts,-How Liability Arises.-A statute that provides for a 
criminal proceeding only does not create a civil liability, and 
a suit for damages predicated on said act is based on the 
theory that the conduct inflicting,the injuries is a common-law 
tort. 
[3] Negligence-Basis of Liability~Signillcance of Criminal Sta~~ 
ute.-The significance of a criminal statute in a civil suit for 
negligence lies in its formulation of a standard of conduct 
that the court adopts in the determination of such liability. 
Unless the court accepts the standard formulated by such, 
statute as the standard to determine civil liability, the, case' 
goes to the jury, which must determine whether the defen~' 
dant has acted a,s a reasonably prudent man, would have in 
similar cireumstances. 
[4] Id.~Violation of Statutes or Ordinances-Basis of Liability.""-, 
When a legislative body has generalized a ,standard frOID the 
experience of the community and prohibits conduct' that is 
likely to cause harm, the court may accept and'apply the 
formulated' standard except where it would serve to impose 
liability without fault. Even if the conduct cannot be- pun-
ished criminally because of irregularities in the adoption . of 
the prohibitory proVisions, thldegislative standard IDay apply 
[3] See 19 Cal.Jur. 545; 38 Am.Jur. 650. 
[4J See 19 Cal.Jur. 632; 38 Am.Jur. 827. 
:McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, §319; [2] Torts, § Ii 
[3] Negligence, § 1; [4] Negligence, § 89; [5] Automobiles,§ 106~ 
.. 
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where it is an appropriate measure for the defendant's eon-
duct, and in accepting such standard the court 'rules in e1Ieat 
that defendant's conduct falls below that of a reasonable m~n. 
[5] Automobiles-Conduct of Operator--StopptD.g-PaUure to Ob~ -
'serve. Stop Sign.~Failuret9 observe a stop-sign is urir~aso~­
ably dangerous conduct whether or not the driver is itnin'une 
from crUninal prosecution because of some, m.:egularity i~ 
the crection of the sign. Such irregularity does' not relieve 
a person from the, duty to exercise, the care of a reasonable 
'man under such circumstances. ' 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Im-
perial County. Vaughn N. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed. ' 
Action for damages for death resulting from an automo. 
bile collision. Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed. 
Hickcox &'Provence and Ross T. Hickcox for Appellant. 
Syril S. Tipton and John J. Ford for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J . ..--This, action was brought to recover dam-
ages for a death caused by an automobiie,;collision: that 
occurred May 20, 1937, at the; intersection of Highline' Road' 
and Oat Canal Road in ImperiaLCounty. The defendantwss 
driving north on Highlin,e Road~s 'RichardGlinks~ales; ithe, 
~l1sband of, onephiinti:tr and father of th~,other~ iW8:s:proeeed;. 
mg 'Yest on Oat CandRoad.' There was: a stop-sign' at:' the: . 
intersection on Highline Road, placed there il:i:1936 bY, a roAd 
fore~ah, with the ,permission ofthesupervisbr':of that'distiict, 
to' gIve gravel trucks the right of ·wa.y"on) OatiOahalRoad/ 
Although ~h~ defendant was ,familiar; with ;this"sign:' ile:~,did 
not stop' hIS car before entering theintersection~,~iHenooked 
inbot.h direc~i~ns but !lid not see tJ:ie'othel'ca.r:c~ming. The, 
resultmg colluuon caused the death of Richard :Clinkscales; 
Defendant appeals from a judgment entered on a'verdict' of 
the:ju,ry in: favor of plaintiffs. '.;: ; , 
, [lal The defendant, contends that'thestop-signwas placed 
on Highline Road at this intElrsect~oIi ille'ga:Qy;and :tiiaff!the' 
trial court's instructions on that ,queStionw-ere 'prejudici!ill-i 
errone?us. The court instructed t1J.e jurY, that'any"pe~s6n ' 
operatmg' a ,motor vehicle in a northerly direction' On', High.' 
o "" " "' •• , , •• ,' ', ••••• ' ••• 
[5] See 2 Cal.Jur. Ten-year SuPP. 323,349;5 Am.J~. 661.' 
• 
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line Road at the intersection with Oat Canal Road was re-
quired to stop before entering it, by virtue of a resolution of 
the Board of Supervisors of Imperial County adopted on 
January 4, 1927, and section 577 of the Vehicle Code' that 
the right of way was controlled by section 552 of the V~hicle 
C~de; and t~atif defendant failed to make the stop and this 
failure proXImately caused the accident the verdict should 
be in ·favor of the plaintiffs. 
At the time of the accident section 577 of the Vehicle 
Code p~ovided: "Veh~cles Must Stop at Through Highways. 
Th: drIver of .any vehIcle upon approaching any entrance of 
a .hIgh~ay ~r Intersection signposted with a stop-sign as pro-
Vlde~ In thIS co?e shall stop at such sign before entering. or 
crOSSIng such hIghway or Intersection." Section' 552 of the 
Vehicle Code provided: "Vehicle Entering Through High-
way .. The driver of any vehicle which has stopped as required 
by th~s code at the entrance to a through highway shall yield 
the rIght of way to other vehicles which have entered the 
~ntersection from the through highway or which are approach-
~ng so. closely on the through highway as to constitute an 
ImmedIate hazard,. but said driver having so yielded may 
proceed ~nd the drIvers of all other vehicles approaching the 
IntersectIOn on the through highway shall yield the right of 
w,ay to the vehicle so about to enter or crOSR the through 
hIghway. " . 
The resolution of January 4,1927, provided: "It is hereby 
resol,ved, found and ordered that the general safety of the 
publIc and the proper and reasonable regulation and control 
of traffic on the public roads and highways in this county 
and outside of incorporated cities and towns require the 
establishment of 'Boulevard stops' at all roads intersecting 
all county and state highways in Imperial County outside of 
incorporated ~ities and to~ns,. and such • Boulevard stoPE!' are 
hereby.estabhshe~ at saId Intersections as provided and 
author.Ized by OrdInance No. 82 of this County." 
OrdInance 82, referred to in the resolution had been passed 
by the board on July 10, 1926, but never became effective 
because of admitted defects in publication. Defendant con-
tends that since the resolution orders the establishment of 
boulevard stops •• as provided and authorized by Ordinance 
No. 82!" ~hich was not legally adopted, there was no legal 
authorIzatIOn for the stop sign, and that the instructions were 
therefore prejudicially erroneous. 
This contention would make the. question of negligence 
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per se turn upon the irregularity of .the authorizatio~.:Wlia#' 
ever the efIectof the irregularity on 'defend~t'$lciirolrialli~,: 
bility, it cannot be assumed that the conditions.that lim~~it 
also limit civil liability. Theproprieiyof taking' trom,' t1ie~ 
jury t~: d~ter~in~t~onof negligencie doesh~t~urIl"on defe~~~: 
ant's crImInalliabIhty. [2] A statute thatproVldesfQl'a ci'ln1-, 
inal proceeding only does not create a civillia:bility;jftherIHs: 
no provision for a remedy by civil ~ctiori to persons injured' 
by a breach of the statute it is because the Legislatlire did ~6t 
contemplate one; A suit for damages is based 'on the theory. 
. that the conduct inflicting the injurlesis a· comInon~law tort; 
in this case the failure to exercise the care of Ii reasohable 
man at a boulevard stop. [31The significance of the statute in a 
civil suit for negligence lies in its formulation of a standard 
of conduct, that the court adopts in the determination of 'such 
liability. (See Holmes, The Common Law, 120-129; Morris, 
The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liab~'lity; 46 Harv. 
L.Rev. 453.) The decision as to what'the civil standa~d 
should be still rests' with the court, and the standard formu-
lated bya legislative body in a police regulation Of:' criniin~r 
statute becomes the standard to determine civil liability only 
because. the ('ourt accepts it. In the absence of such a standard 
the case goes to the jury, which must determine :whether the, 
defendant has acted as a reasonably prudent. man would act 
in siinilar circumstances. The;lury then has. the burden of 
. deciding not only what the facts are but wpat the umQrmu-
Iated standard is of reasonable conduct. [4] When a legislative 
body has generalized a standard from the experience of ihe 
community and prohibits conduct that is likely to cause harm, 
the court accepts the formulated standards and applies them 
. (Siemers v. Eisen, 54 Cal. 418; Cragg, v. Los Angeles Tr'Ust 
Co., 154 ·Cal. 663 [98 P. 1063 16 .Ann.Cas., 1061].; see cases 
cited in 19 Cal.Jur. 632 et seq., Osborne v. McMasters, '40 
Minn. 103 [41 N.W.543, 12 Am.St.Rep.698]; see Restate~ 
ment: Torts, sec. 286), except where theyw0;nld, .!'Ierva, to 
impose liability without fault. (Berkovitz v. American' R~ve.r . 
Gravel Co., 191 Cal. 195 [215 P. 675] ; Burlie .. v. ,St,ephens; 
113 Wash. 182 [193 P. 684] ; Tedla v. ElZma~, 280 N.Y: 1.24. 
[19 N.E.2d 987] ; see 13Cal.L.Rev. 428; 37 Mich~L.Rev. 81L) 
Even if the conduct cannot be punished criminally be-
cause of irregularities in the adoption of the prohibitory: 
provisions, the legislative standard may neverthelefils. apply if 
it is an appropriate measure for the defendanfs conduct,: 
[ ,~ 
" 
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When the court ac~epts the standard it rules in' effect that 
defendant's conduct falls below that of a reasonable man as 
the court conceives it. It' does no more than It does in any 
ruling that certain acts or omissions amount as a matter of 
law to negligence. (Restatement : Torts, sec. 285.) [lblAriap-
pellate court is concerned with determining whether thc trial 
court arrived at a ,proper standard in a particular case. In 
this case the trial court rightly instructed the jury that meas-
ured by the standard set up by the resolution of the board of 
supervisors and the Vehicle Code it was negligence' as a 
matter of law to disregard the stop-sign. [5] Failure to observe 
a stop~sign is unreasonably dangerous conduct whetheroi" not 
the driver is immune from criminal prosecution because of 
some irregularity in the erection of the stop-sigil.Ifa through 
artery has been posted with stop-signs by the public authori-
ties in the customarY way and to all appearances by regular 
procedure, any reasonable man should know that the public 
naturally relies upon their observance. If a driver from a side 
street enters the ostensibly protected boulevard without stop-
ping, in disregard. of the posted safeguards, contrary to what 
drivers thereoh could reasonably have expected him to do he 
is guilty of negligence regardless of ariy irregularity att~nd­
ing the authorization of the signs. (Oomfort v. Penner, 166 
Wash. 177 [6P.2d 604] ; Mayfield v. Orowdus;38 N.M.471[35 
P.2d291] ; Fothergill v. Kaija, 183 Wash. 112 [48P.2d 643, 
53 P.2d 1198]; Flood v.Miura, 120 Cal.App. 467 [8 P.2d 
552]:) Such irregularity does not relieve a person from the 
duty to exercise the care of a reasonable man under such ,cir-
cumstances. Othei"wisea stop-'sign would become a trap for 
innocent persons who rely upon it. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson,C. J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and. Peters, J; pro tem., 
concurred. . 
SHENK,J.,-I dissent......,.The triaJ court instructed the jury 
that the defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of 
law if he f/!.iled to stop on Highline Road at its intersection 
with Oat Canal Road. The. basis for the instruction \Vas the 
false~ssttID.ptionthat lHgliIine R<?ad was signposted' with a 
stOP-SIgn as then provided.by section 577 of the 'Vehicle Code. 
There was no stop.;gign so posted. Some stop signal was in~ 
stalled at the intersection but without any legal authorization 
therefor. The question of the defendant's negligence under 
Apr. 1943] CAMINETTI v. PAOIFIC MUT. L~ INs. Co. 11 
the circumstances was, in my opinion, a question of fact for 
the jury. The cases cited in the 'majority opinion go no 
further than to hold that the jury may consider the existence 
of a so-called de facto stop-sign in determining the question 
of the defendant's negligence. The withdrawal of that issue 
from the jury in the present case was manifestly 'prejudicial. 
At the time of the impact the Clinkscales car was traveling 
on the left or wrong side of the road and, from thee'Vidence 
of the physical facts, must have been going at an excessive 
rate of speed. Freed from the erroneous instruction the' jury 
might well have found that the negligence of the deceased 
'was the sole proximate cause of the collision. 
Edmonds, J., concurred. , 
[L. A., No. 18391. In Bank., Apr. 30, 1943.] 
A. CAMINETTI, JR., as Insurance Commissioner, etc., Ap-
pellant, v. THE PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA (a Corporation) 
et aI., Respondents. 
[L. A. No. 18396. In Bank. Apr. 3~, 1943.] 
A. CAMINETTI, JR., as Insurance Commissioner, etc., Peti-
, tioner, v. THE PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA (a CorporatIon) et al., 
Respondents; JOHN HARNISH, Appellant. 
[1] Insurance-Corporations-Rebbilitation-Olaims of Old Poli-
c:yholders.-Where assets of an insurance company ~er~. trans-
ferred to a new company pursuant to a rehabilitation and rein-
surance agreement giving the policyholders· of the, .old com-
pany an option to accept or reject. the rein~urancewithin a 
certain period and declaring that a failure to give the,~ew com-
pany written notice of their rejection woUld be, deemed.an ac-
ceptance, and where an order of liquidation alsc> gave such poli-
cyholders the right to 1lIe claims for breach of their,policiesithe 
, . ,I,.:: 
[1] See 14 Cal.Jur. 646, 660; 29 Am.Jur. 96, loi7. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4-6] Insurance,§ ll;· [3J Insur-
~~§~"
